In the conventional economics literature, central bank independence and insulation from government intervention are widely regarded as fundamental institutional pillars of sound monetary governance. This framework emphasizes price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy and advocates limiting the influence of fiscal authorities over monetary decision-making, presenting central bank independence as a universally applicable institutional arrangement regardless of a country's stage of economic development. Historical evidence from the successful East Asian economies, however, suggests a markedly different institutional configuration during the early and intermediate stages of development. Rather than being characterized by institutional separation, the relationship between the central bank and the government was founded on close coordination and institutional integration between the monetary and fiscal authorities. Within a coherent governance framework, this arrangement facilitated the alignment of monetary and credit policies with industrial development strategies and supported the expansion of the real sector of the economy. Drawing on a comparative analysis of the monetary laws of selected East Asian economies, this study evaluates the degree of central bank independence during their early and intermediate stages of economic transformation. The institutional position of the central bank is assessed using a legal central bank independence framework encompassing three dimensions: objectives, political independence, and economic independence. The findings indicate that central banks in the selected countries exhibited relatively low levels of legal independence during the periods under examination. Instead, close institutional coordination with the government in pursuit of national development objectives constituted the prevailing model of monetary governance rather than an exception. These findings underscore the importance of incorporating a country's stage of economic development into the design and evaluation of monetary governance frameworks.